Electronic Money Free Banking and Some Implications for Central Banking by Yuksel Gormez & Christopher Houghton Budd
 









+ and Christopher Houghton Budd
++ 
 
+ Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 
Research and Monetary Policy Department 
 
+,++ Department of Banking and Finance 










This paper discusses electronic money, its relation to free banking and some implications 
for central banking. It begins by introducing its conceptual framework for modern central 
banking, in terms of which it then rehearses the free banking argument. It then reviews the 
development of e-money in terms of both electronic payment methods and electronic issue, 
with special attention paid to the latter. The discussion includes both mainstream 
developments, such as Mondex, and ‘alternative’ schemes such as LETS. From here the 
paper proceeds by way of a consideration of the synergy between electronic issue of money 
and free banking precepts, to a consideration of some implications for the future of central 
banking generally. It offers an ‘contestable’ model of central banking, which endeavours to 
show the effects that e-money may be expected to have (and, indeed, may already be having) 
as regards monetary policy, financial supervision and seignorage. It concludes that even in its 
current stage of development, the emergence of e-money not only reflects and supports key 
free banking concepts, but may be nudging modern central banking towards free banking 
practice. 
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Our aim in this paper is to discuss the possible impact of electronic money (e-
money) on central banking. The frame of reference is the free banking debate, 
which revolves around the issue whether or not central banks are in fact necessary 
and useful. The free banking controversy has highlighted several conditions, which 
are critical for monetary systems to function well in the absence of a traditional 
central bank. The way in which these conditions come into play is being 
transformed by information technology, however, and we want to consider the 
ensuing possibilities and challenges for the monetary system. 
We begin by introducing a conceptual framework summarising the role of 
central banking in a modern monetary economy. This framework is based on 
distinguishing the different functions and tasks of central banking as regards the 
management of the monetary system, in order to find out how the development of 
e-money might affect the “public-good” nature of these functions. 
The second section of the paper overviews the case for free banking as an 
alternative to the current monetary policy framework and pinpoints the parts of the 
argument relevant to the emergence of e-money.  
Section three reviews the development of e-money in terms of both electronic 
payment methods (representative e-money) and electronic issuance of currency 
(independent e-money). We focus on the latter because were it to be shown that e-
money qua unit of account was not an alternative to conventional money 
circulation, then its ultimate effect is unlikely to go beyond the displacement of 
currency in circulation by advanced payment systems including credit and debit 
cards or advanced clearing systems – something that has been going on for some 
time now. After defining e-money, the paper investigates its implications with 
regard to finance, banking and the functions of money. 
Section four considers the relationship between e-money and free banking 
precepts. The discussion details how e-money helps to address three main aspects 
of the free banking debate – the lender of last resort function, currency backing, and 
multiplicity of currencies. The focus of this section is on possible implications for 
the future of central banking generally, rather than predicting radical change to the 
current monetary policy framework. If the incumbent central banks could be led to 
behave in a way, which would make their currencies as attractive as those produced,  
 
 




by the private sector, the benefits of the free banking system may be attained even 
without displacing current institutions or currencies. In the fifth section, we offer an 
‘contestable’ model of central banking, which endeavours to take into account 
effects that e-money may be expected to have on monetary policy and seignorage. 
We stress the importance of the market mechanism on central banking and note that 
this may enable (or force) central banks to offer some of the benefits associated 
with “free banking” even under the present institutional arrangements, while 
defending the integrity of money for the whole society.  
The last section presents our conclusions. 
2. Background 
We begin by clarifying the view of central banking that provides the background 
to this paper, and the conceptual framework in terms of which our discussion is 
formulated. Our focus is on the central monetary authority in its most basic 
functions, shorn of its role as banker to or agent of government and no longer 
handling debt management or other services that can as easily be provided by 
private firms 
In this context, the central monetary agency is assigned three main functions – 
facilitating price stability, promoting financial stability, and ensuring the integrity 
of money, with the third of these arguably subsisting in the other two (Figure A). 
Money is a public good which has certain systemic network externalities at its core. 
In a word, the integrity of money refers to money’s ability to remain a reliable and 
stable cover for purchasing power over time (short, medium and long-term). It 
refers to the soundness of money, implying the absence of ‘bad’ (over-issued) 
money, while the concept of a stable measure connects it to the unit of account 
function of money and related topics, such as network externalities and the 
enforcement of legal tender provisions. Integrity of money, in other words, entails 
anything that increases or sustains the reliability of the unit of account by 
convincing economic entities to trust to the future quality of money. It covers the 
avoidance of inflationary effects but goes beyond that to include anything that may 























It is in this sense that we say the integrity of money subsists in price stability and 
financial stability, since its ability to act as a stable measure will be maintained if 
price stability is maintained and if price stability in turn is not undermined by 
financial instability. Price stability can be understood as a short-hand reference to 
the wider concept of central bank independence (whether instrument or goal, partial 
or complete) with its concern to provide a constitutional context appropriate to price 
stability and its need to meet the challenge posed by competition in the quality of 
money -the possibility of enabling good money to reaching the end user. With its 
focus directly on the avoidance of inflation, price stability is clearly related to the 
means of exchange function of money, also referring to currency competition with a 
mechanism of direct danger of substitution in case of an unreliable monetary policy. 
Financial stability, on the other hand, addresses such issues as free entry to financial 
service provision and the perfection of information by promoting financial 
awareness of individual economic entities. It also deals with problems of regulation 
and supervision of the financial sector and is thus related to the store of value 
function of money, although we recognise that there is continuing debate over 
whether financial supervision should or can be divorced from the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
Although we only intend it for exploratory purposes, a further image (Figure B) 
can be derived from Figure A., an image that is not an arbitrary invention on our 
part. It has its genesis in Keynes’s (1923) discussion on monetary reform and seems 
to be born out in current experience by the case of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ), for example, which describes its strategy as one that, wherever 
Figure A : Three Main Functions of Central Banking
INTEGRITY OF MONEY
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possible, leaves it to the markets to do the central bank’s work. As regards 
monetary policy, this means the pursuit of price stability by way of single objective 
monetary policy. In terms of supervision, the RBNZ calls on banks (99% of which 
in New Zealand are foreign-owned) to account directly to the public in terms of 
meaningful reporting and transparency. The third function, the integrity of money, 
the Bank reserves to itself in its capacity as sole issuer of the NZ dollar - a fact, the 
Bank believes, that gives it a force over against otherwise autonomous global 
markets. While one may wonder at the certainty of this last claim, the interesting 
point in terms of our framework is that the RBNZ may not be just a one-off or 
special case. It may indicate a generic along the lines of the Goodhartian (1988; 1) 
definition of a central bank as an “outside agency to regulate and control the 
banking system … in the otherwise free working of a free market.” 
 
This image also reflects Issing’s (1999) criticism of Hayek’s (1990) claim that it 
is free competitive issue of money that guarantees a stable and efficient monetary 
system. For Issing, money is accepted as a public good and because money acts as a 
basic convention in society, like language and standards of physical measure. Issing 
points to the network externalities involved in the use of money in transactions and 
criticises Hayek’s assumption that complete, symmetric and free information would 
obtain in a monetary system based on competitive currency. He also questions the 
transition period and argues that the change to competitive issue would be 
inflationary itself and generate uncertainty for future prices. For these reasons, 
Issing envisages money as a public convention standing above the fray. 
Figure B : A Possible Generic Form of Central Banking
INTEGRITY OF MONEY









Finally, such a generic image may serve to indicate, in responding to modern 
developments, central banking is undergoing a transformation away from unitary 
forms towards an articulated expression. Our interest is, therefore, in developing a 
relevant, appropriate, and viable tool of analysis for understanding the possible 
effects of e-money’s seeming affinity with free banking on central banking 
generally, giving evidence where available of such effects 
3. Free Banking 
The location of monetary policy in central banks is a recent development in the 
history of finance. Central banks became monetary policy makers only as the gold 
standard was replaced by fiat money, which was controlled by governments. There 
are alternatives to central banking as practised today, like currency boards, full 
convertibility (under a commodity standard) and free banking, which we discuss 
here in some detail.  
3.1. Definitions and Characterisations 
The assumption of this paper is that central banks are facing fundamental 
changes, which may in the end lead to their demise or, as argued here, a 
transformation of their behaviour in a way that approximates the free banking 
concept at least in some key respects. This possibility is not of our invention, of 
course; the existence of central banks is already under discussion. For example, 
King (1999) argued that “central banks may be at the peak of their power. There 
may well be fewer central banks in the future, and their extinction cannot be ruled 
out. Societies have managed without central banks in the past. They may well do so 
again in the future.” This was also the focus of a recent World Bank Conference on 
the future of monetary policy. Although these discussions do not directly consider 
the idea of free banking as an alternative to the current monetary policy framework, 
it may be that, once the continued existence of central banking is brought into 
question, free banking may yet emerge as an alternative, or provide an important 
benchmark in whatever transformation comes about. 
White (1995) defines free banking as “a monetary system without a central bank, 
under which the issuing of currency and deposit money is left to legally unrestricted 
private banks,” a definition representative of a general consensus in the free 
banking literature - see, for example, Dowd (1993). White points out that, as a 
monetary regime, free banking consists of two main elements - unregulated issue of 
transferable bank liabilities and unmanipulated supply of base money or basic cash.  
 
 




There is no government role in regard to the quantity of money produced inside or 
outside the banking industry, and outside money free of central bank control is 
desirable. Money issue is not seen as a device of governments to achieve their 
goals, but operates as the means for individuals to pursue their own purposes. That 
said, White (1995) does not reject the idea of a clearing house (considered later in 
this section) at the centre of the financial system when without a central bank; his 
view is that this should be a market mechanism designed to eliminate imperfections 
within the financial system.  
As envisaged by Dowd and others, free banking is regarded as the multiple issue 
of currencies by competing banks, whose notes, however, are interchangeable and 
redeemable against a “community-recognised commodity”, while option clauses 
protect against “sudden excessive demands for liquidity”. This last is an 
arrangement that obviates the need for a lender of last resort, since free banking is a 
system in which monetary and financial stability are guaranteed by market 
determination of the preferred currencies and interest rates. Dowd (1996) has 
underlined the basic requirements for successful free banking based on private 
money. One of them was the emergence of a clearing system. Another was the use 
of option-clauses - auto-control mechanisms used in cases of ‘fire-sales’ to defend 
against bank-runs. The final one was the development of a private lender of last 
resort within the financial sector to help individual institutions that were solvent but 
facing a liquidity crisis. In an earlier study, Dowd defined the distinctive features of 
a free banking system as: 
1.  Multiple note issuers who would guarantee to redeem their notes in a 
commodity recognised as valuable. 
2. A regular note exchange between note issuers, and 
3.  The insertion of option clauses into the convertibility contracts to protect the 
note issuers against sudden excessive demands for liquidity (Dowd, 1993). 
An important contribution to the literature came from Hayek (1990). While not 
restricting free banking to a commodity standard only, when arguing for the 
denationalisation of money, Hayek said that “the past instability of the market is the 
consequence of the exclusion of the most important regulator of the market 
mechanism, money, from itself being regulated by the market process.” He thereby 
invoked the idea of the invisible hand as the basic requirement for a successful 
monetary policy regime. The invisible hand is thus seen to lead to the most reliable  
 
 




money, while competition is deemed to play its part in the issue of money also. 
Hayek also argued that central banks should be abolished, since the free issue of 
competitive currencies would solve the lender of last resort and elasticity of 
circulation problems in a financial system. He argued that the demand for a lender 
of last resort arises from liquidity crises created by nationalised currencies, whereas 
under competitive issue there is no risk of excess liquidity as the competing 
currencies are fully backed by purchasing power. It is in this sense that central 
banking can be seen to be not the only choice for a monetary policy framework, 
especially if it is not able to guarantee the integrity of money as a reliable medium 
of exchange and store of value. 
Free banking as an alternative to central banking was discussed by Capie, 
Goodhart, Fischer, and Schnadt (1994). Although they described today’s free 
banking proposals as a “somewhat fringe academic exercise without much support 
from financial practitioners,” they emphasised that free banking ought not to be 
discounted as an alternative to central banks and currency boards for the operation 
of monetary systems. They pointed out that the preference of governments for 
central banking stems from national pride and seigniorage interests, while the 
financial community in general and commercial banks in particular support the 
central banking option for two reasons of their own. First, commercial banks 
economise systemic non-interest bearing reserves by offering a safety-net. As a 
result they are able to reduce individual bank capital requirements when providing 
leadership in joint exercises like establishing payments and settlement systems. 
Second, commercial banks enjoy an influence on central bank decisions through the 
dynamics of the relationships between controllers and controlled, supervisors and 
supervised. (This influence may not, however, extend to the full theory of capture, 
which argues that commercial banks capture central banks and thus approve their 
operations.) 
Capie and his colleagues identified four problems associated with free banking 
theory: 
1. It may lead to extra transaction costs. 
2. Some additional bank reserves of real assets may be needed. 
3. There may be possible minor inefficiencies connected with multiple note issue.  
 
 




4.  It seems indeterminate how the system as a whole behaves since free banking 
theory relies on the law of flux
1.  
They also noted that an insufficiently capitalised bank would adopt a riskier 
portfolio due to the incentive to allow any resulting loss to fall on the depositors or 
an insurance fund. 
They then summarised four responses of free banking advocates to the argument 
that free banking may lead to bank runs and contagious panics. The first is the 
denial of the likelihood of such events in a free, competitive system. The second is 
the argument that an implicit central bank safety net or a deposit insurance scheme 
invites moral hazard (absent in free banking), while intrusive regulation to minimise 
moral hazard leads to further distortion and misallocation of resources. The third is 
that free banking decreases susceptibility to instability through its adoption of self-
regulatory mechanisms like option clauses, clearing houses, and narrow banking. 
The fourth is the denial of any sizeable externalities and social losses in excess of 
internalised private losses in the case of banking failures. Such possible 
externalities were not found to be potentially greater in banking than in other 
industries. 
3.2. Clearing House and ‘Central’ 
Central to the free banking concept is the clearing house. Under the clearing 
house system not only do currencies clear, but over issue is pre-empted. If a 
participant issues more than it can clear, the clearing house immediately will realise 
it and put sanctions on the member so that the problem will never get out of hand. It 
is important to note, that, although against central banking, free banking recognises, 
both theoretically and in practical instances, the need for a centralised clearing 
function – not on political grounds, to be sure, but out of the practicalities of 
enabling the interchangeability of currencies yet providing for the return of over-
supplied or ‘bad’ money. It is also said that this clearing function is in the self-
interest of the issuers of currency. Moreover, Horowitz (1992) regards clearing as 
neutral to the players so that it can be said to be without (or contextual to) rather 
than within the market. 
                                                 
1 The theory of reflux is explained as a situation where a note issuing bank will lose/gain reserves at the 
clearing if it expands faster/slower than other competing note issuing banks.  
 
 




In the light of the free banking debate, if one considers central banking in its 
economic, as distinct from its political meaning, the adjective ‘central’ can be read 
as referring not to governments’ use of central banks as instruments of centralised 
financial control, but to the fact that the financial system ineluctably has nodal 
points or centres, places at which the system as a whole comes to a focus. Since this 
also underlies the free banking concept of a clearinghouse, it is not, therefore, a 
question of whether or not such a central agency can be avoided, but of the form it 
takes, whether it is forced by a ‘central bank’, which is given a monopoly by fiat or 
whether it is shaped by market forces: national or international financial markets for 
example. 
Insofar as free banking is based on competitive issue of money, end-user 
preference is a function of the soundness or backing of money, not just its name. It 
is important to note in this regard that, although sound money usually means ‘real’ 
backing, real can have various meanings, ranging from ‘solid gold’ to non-
inflationary behaviour. In this sense, if a national currency (even if state-issued) 
fulfils the requirements of price stability in a way specified by the users of money, 
it should be able to compete with other currencies. In this sense, the recent advent 
of central bank independence and stability-oriented central banking arrangements 
may act as a transition arrangement or conversion device. Monetary arrangements 
working much like the free banking system may not, therefore, be as distant a 
prospect as one might think, hence the importance of avoiding too fixed usage of 
terms, giving rise to a false contrast between the free banking doctrine and the 
underlying nature of modern financial developments. 
In sum, free banking envisages an environment without central banks and is put 
forward as an alternative to central banking, meaning central banks when subject to 
political manipulation and thus made into distorting agencies. Whatever the final 
outcome of the debate, these arguments and counter-arguments reflect the fact that 
central banking is not the only monetary policy framework available to us. It is 
Hayek’s contention that other approaches should be explored, and competitive 
money issue in particular. His point is that in a free environment with concurrent 
currencies, it will be people with better ideas who determine development through 
their imitation of what works best, as opposed to a national currency system where 








4. Electronic Money 
Electronic money has different shapes. Up till very recently, electronisation of 
the payment systems has been based on improvements in account-based systems, 
their reach (domain) and their speed. Account-based systems record all the 
transactions and authorise them centrally, whereas non-account-based systems 
circulate e-tokens through telecommunication networks or on smart cards and may 
allow transactions without central authorisation. Account-based e-money systems 
are really very little different from the debit card of credit card networks of EFT 
systems currently in use. Token-based e-money, “e-cash”, on the other hand, is 
radically different in the sense that it introduces an electronic form of currency. 
Ultimately, the impact of the perfection of account-based systems of electronic 
transfer and the expansion of token-based e-money is the same because both 
compete with (or create an alternative to) the use of conventional currencies in 
payments. Paper currency has hitherto been able to compete against account-based 
payment systems because of its anonymity and the absence of verification costs, 
which have been prohibitively high for very small payments (“micropayments”). 
Now, the challenge to paper money comes from both sides – the reduction in 
verification costs on the one hand and the development of electronic tokens, which 
avoid verification altogether. The major difference between these two systems is 
actually just the cost of authorisation as e-cash targets micro-payments. The other is 
security. If the authorisation cost can be lowered to a certain level so that even 
micro-payments are executed by accountable systems, it may be expected that even 
the non-account-based systems may prefer to authorise all the transactions due to 
security concerns. In that case, the distinction between token-based systems and 
account-based systems would become rather blurred. 
Regardless of the form of e-money, the main technological developments behind 
e-money are firstly the decreasing cost of communication, and secondly the 
increasing computing power in ever smaller units. The first one favours all kind of 
networking models including the conventional and mobile Internet and also local, 
national and international networks based on digital personal assistants, digital TV, 
ATMs and any other networking model that will be designed and developed in the 
future. Cheapening communication not only allows to lower the operating cost of 
existing networks but also provides an opportunity to create alternative or 
competing local, national or international networks as well.   
 
 




The increasing power of computing allows the operation of networks with 
improved data and risk management techniques, including artificial intelligence and 
cryptography. It may be argued that e-money will be the most sensitive data on the 
networks and unless managed perfectly with almost risk-free technology (or at least 
less risky than currency), the e-money will never succeed. This development is thus 
very critical. Increasing computing power will also reduce the cost of secure 
hardware including smart cards, as more advanced processors are being developed.  
The formal definition of e-money offered by the European Central Bank is as 
follows: “an electronic store of monetary value on a technical device that may be 
widely used for making payments to undertakings other than the issuer without 
necessarily involving bank accounts in the transaction, but acting as a prepaid 
bearer instrument.” (ECB 1998, p.7.) This definition highlights some important 
aspects of e-money:  
 - The fact that it stores monetary value on a technical device with a capacity to 
be used widely for making payments.  
  -    Its role as a prepaid bearer instrument, excluding account-based electronic 
payment instruments such as credit and debit cards and EFT payments. 
 - Its use to cover payments to undertakings other than the issuer, essential to 
differentiating e-money products from single purpose prepaid cards like telephone 
cards.  
-  Its ability to by-pass bank accounts or any other financial service providers’ 
authorisation.  
Because it does not specify the type of technical device used, such a definition 
serves as a useful starting point and is well suited to a development that is in an 
emerging state, the full technical potential of which remains unclear. In particular, 
the above definition includes card-based schemes, which can be used in 
conventional retail commerce, as well as various types of “cyber money” which are 
designed to circulate in the Internet. The definition is unsatisfactory, however, in 
two respects: Firstly, it may overemphasise the technical distinction between 
account-based and token-based systems, which have ultimately similar effects. 
Secondly, it does not distinguish clearly enough two quite distinct kinds of e-money 
issuance strategies: the conventional strategy of a new electronic payments medium  
 
 




and the more radical one of electronic issue of alternative, competing currencies 
(not based on conventional, government-organised monies). 
We might call the two different kinds of e-money "representative" and 
"independent" e-money, respectively. As long as it is representative of legal tender 
under a given monetary policy framework, 'e-cash' is a form and extension of cash 
generally, an addition to coinage, notes, cheques and debit and credit cards, etc. In 
this respect, e-money is clearly nominal in its effects - such as increasing velocity - 
and may be regarded as neutral in terms of systemic change. It has important 
implications for the current monetary framework, in that it makes for easier 
payments, revolutionises monetary base management, and enriches currency choice 
through making it easier to use several currencies and/or to switch between them. It 
would reduce the demand for conventional central bank money. But, e-money as a 
mere representation of a given currency may have no different effect on monetary 
policy frameworks than what has already been caused by advanced payment 
systems, which have decreased the proportion of currency in circulation to total 
money stock especially in the last couple of decades. 
However, the impact of e-money would seem to be most significant when it 
comes to the electronic issue of non-bank money, that is, money issued without 
reference to banking reserves. If e-money is introduced as independent money, not 
a representation of any conventional currency, it may have the potential to 
revolutionise the competition among monetary policy frameworks. This impact may 
well be different for developed and developing countries: For developed countries, 
it may provoke 'currency competition' among core currencies like Dollar and Euro, 
or perhaps between these traditional currencies and new, privately issued monies (if 
the performance of the incumbent central banks is seen as unsatisfactory by money 
users). For developing countries, it may facilitate and speed up currency 
substitution to dollarisation and/or Euroisation. 
4.1. Implications for Finance 
E-money and related technologies would seem to have powerful consequences 
and serious impact on the future of finance for at least two main reasons. Firstly, 
with increased on-line connection between the service provider and the end user, 
information quality is not only increased but it individualises it as well. Mutual flow 
of information allows both the service provider and the customer to develop a better 
relationship base, which will allow lowering the potentials of panic during financial  
 
 




crises. This new model of relation may allow individual valuation of particular 
financial service providers so as to decrease systemicity (contagious) between 
financial institutions. Because once the end-user has all the information about the 
service provider including the potential risks that may arise from any change in the 
financial market conditions, any potential danger for a systemic run may be 
expected to decrease compared to conventional financial market conditions. 
Secondly, all the financial assets may get digitised even further, a trend that is 
already clear. Recently, bonds, bills and securities are all electronically represented 
as electronic assets with a technology similar to EFT, allowing smaller and flexibly 
denominations for example. As a result, clearing, trading and custody services are 
getting to be cheaper, easier and more importantly, open to any customer all around 
the world, which eliminates local independence. E-money, in this respect, favours 
all these electronisation of finance by providing a medium for sustainable micro-
transactions and speed up the reach of individualised services. To give an example 
from current financial markets, an alternative to SWIFT or credit and debit card 
networks may be both cheaper to design and easier to operate so as to open the 
market for competition, which will increase efficiency and effectiveness of the 
service quality 
One interesting impact of e-money phenomenon is very apparent in the 
emergence of ‘closed circuit currencies’, ranging from the marginal and ‘low tech’ 
but numerous local exchange trading systems (LETS),
2 through corporate barter 
arrangements in the conventional business world,
3 to experiments in bank-created e-
money such as Mondex,
4 and Internet-based currencies such as Beenz
5. As a 
consequence, payment systems become simplified and easier to handle, inviting 
new entrants into the industry, challenging credit and debit card infrastructures as 
well. We mention Mondex and Beenz in particular because, first of all, of more than 
fifty e-money proposals with very different approaches to micropayment solutions 
on the Internet, Mondex is one of the few to allow person-to-person transfers 
without the involvement of financial service providers. Thießen (1999) surveyed 
                                                 
2 Good (1998) mentions 470 such systems in the world, mainly in the US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Britain, as well as around 30 low-technology local currencies. There are also many LETS 
schemes in France, Belgium and Italy. They typically have less than 300 members, often people from 
‘alternative life-style’ movements. 
3 The oldest established is the WIR system in Switzerland. Founded in 1934, it now has over 60,000 
members and an annual turnover in excess of 2,500 million CHF. 
4 www.mondex.com, www.mondexinternational.com, www.mondex.ca, www.mondexusa.com  
5 www.beenz.com  
 
 




most of these proposals ranging from Digicash
6 to Mondex. The second reason is 
that, although the company that operates Beenz began the scheme as a purely 
Internet-based approach, it recently co-operated with Mondex to benefit from smart 
card technology in order to issue and redeem Beenz on conventional transactions as 
well, so that Mondex cards will be used to earn and spend Beenz. In this 
connection, it is worth noting that almost all the major banks now operate Internet-
based services, but there are also non-bank initiatives, such as Prudential 
Insurance’s “Egg”,
7 which has received deposits of more than £6 billion in less than 
two years. 
4.2. Implications for Banking 
Whatever other functions banks provide, whether these be credit creation, 
intermediation or settlement, they all rely on the precision and objectivity of their 
record keeping. They also are all required to maintain a clear distinction between 
their own funds, which they seek to increase, and the funds they manage for others, 
which they, are required to match and hold at net zero. On the other hand, as the 
case of LETS makes very clear, the essential banking function is that of a shared or 
centralised accountant and has a societal nature. Insofar as this function cannot 
devolve to the members or clients either individually or collectively, it would 
always emerge as something we benefit from in common, contextual to rather than 
part of a smooth-running economic life. This would be the case even in private or 
marketised arrangements. Insofar as banks carry out other functions, however, none 
of them is as core as its bookkeeping service and none of them can as reliably be 
assumed to belong to banking on a permanent basis. Goodhart (2000) addressed this 
advantage of banks as well when as he mentioned the need for portfolio selections 
consultancy that may sustain bank’s future in the financial markets. More 
importantly, the more money can be created outside the banking system – in the 
financial markets, for example, or in the folksier LETS schemes - the less does it 
rely on bank deposits
8.  
E-money creates an opportunity to decrease the cost of banking in one way and 
makes easy to handle portfolio management procedures by allowing to increase the 
                                                 
6 Digicash has been one of the most famous proposals for e-cash, but the company went into bankruptcy 
at the end of 1998 and sold all intellectual property to Ecash Technologies, a company that intends to 
exploit the idea of e-cash. 
7 www.egg.com. 































































size of the number of customer and the service regions by allowing network based 
solutions, with the power to ignore location dependence. This, at the end, enriches 
end-users’ right to choose among financial service providers and increase 
competitive pressures on service providers though very flexible opportunities to 
change the service providers to which proving the best service with the most 
reliable data. These developments can only be reinforced by the fact that the fixed 
investment necessary for an Internet bank has fallen to around $1 million (Gosling, 
1999). This may suggest a ‘structural change’ in the establishment of banks so as to 
reduce the barriers to entry to banking arising from the high amount of fixed and 
operating cost and limiting barriers to the expertise that banks has been 
accumulating for many years. Competition, as well, will be powered with ease of 
entry so that any new establishment with expertise based solutions for banking 
services with increased quality will get a better chance for success. 
There is also the fact that, as a seemingly inevitable process in history, the 
monetary base as a proportion of total money stock has been diminishing for quite a 
long time. Indeed, it may be that one of the important effects of e-money is its 
potential to change totally the traditional management of the monetary base. 
Chart 1 shows UK trends since 1970 for the velocity (defined as total GNP 
divided by total monetary base (GNP/M0)) and money multiplier (defined as 
monetary base divided by total money stock (M0/M4)). In the period prior to 1990,  
 
 




the proportion of monetary base in the total money stock decreased to as low as 4%, 
while velocity more than doubled to nearly 30. 
Again, this decrease is not caused by e-money as such, but by improvements in 
electronic payment instruments such as debit and credit cards and the development 
of same-time financial applications such as direct credit and debit. Indeed, it is not 
difficult to imagine that, in a perfectly digitalised or electronic payment 
infrastructure, in which all manner of transactions including micro payments are 
effected through digital transfer of value from payer to payee, the record keeping 
nature of money will enable the identification of any potential lack of demand 
(within the registered economy at least) for banknotes and coin as a medium of 
exchange. Combined with such developments, which serve only to further 
individualise our experience of the bookkeeping function of money, e-money can 
be expected to promote the growing trend towards what one can term ‘self-
administered banking’ and ‘narrow banking’. Together with telephone banking, 
online banking, mobile-phone banking, computer-based accounting, and all other 
aspects of electronic finance, e-money enables and promotes the individual person 
or organisation, household or firm, as the locus of financial awareness and 
responsibility
9. Banks and the banking system generally are thereby rendered more 
and more a resource or tool and less and less the determinant of their clients’ 
financial actions. 
4.3. The Functions of Money 
One of the implications of the improvements in the electronic communications 
and computing technology is that they alter the traditional complementarity 
between the functions of money. In monetary systems based on paper currency and 
slow and expensive access to information, the three functions of money (unit of 
account, means of payment, and store of value) were almost always connected: the 
same instruments – money – served as means of payment, were nominated in the 
unit of account (actually, defined the unit of account), and were also an important 
form of wealth. Exceptions to this occurred only in exceptional circumstances 
(under hyperinflation, rationing of goods, financial crisis and so on) when the 
integrity of money is no longer obvious. The reason for the almost universal 
                                                 
9 In terms of good financial management, the same effect could be expected on the part of governments, 








connection of the three functions is in the associated savings in transaction costs 
under the traditional payment technology. 
Electronisation of payments and transaction situations in general has the power 
to change this. This is the result of improved communications and information. 
When up-to-the minute price information (such as exchange rates and asset prices) 
are available in any transaction, and when wealth can instantly be transferred from 
one asset to another, the reasons why the functions of money should be connected 
become weaker and weaker. Transactions may be paid for with assets which are not 
denominated in the same units in which the prices are quoted; and the amount of 
welath actually kept in the form of the means of payment may be minimal.  
The three functions of money in a “unified” system can be thought of as 
exhibited in figure C: 
If represented thus, the idea arises that the three functions of money may be the 
monetary version of our earlier depiction of the three main functions of a central 
monetary agency (see Figure A). If that were the case, it would be reasonable to 
expect that, just as central banking seems to be undergoing a transformation from a 
unitary to a devolved or articulated form, so money may also be subject to the same 
process. In other words, we may need to pass from the idea of money as consisting 
of three functions somehow linked and held together as if from a central point, to 
the notion of money as the combination or combined effect of three distinct 
processes (Figure D). 
 
Figure D : Articulated Money
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This development, if it occurs, makes it increasingly difficult for central banks to 
rely on their legal tender powers as suppliers of the mandatory means of payment to 
entail a unified unit of account in their respective economies, or a large demand for 
central bank money (reserves or currency). This is not necessarily a new idea. Issing 
(1999) mentions the prospect for separating the functions of money, as do Browne 
and Cronin (1995). E-money just extends this possibility and changes the dynamics 
of money as a result. 
5. Electronic Money and Free Banking 
The direct or indirect relationship between e-money and free banking has been 
addressed quite often recently. For example, Browne and Cronin (1996) pointed out 
that laissez-faire banking could emerge endogenously over time in response to 
technological improvements in information and financial products. As a result, 
regulation of the banking industry after e-money could prove unjustified because of 
the system’s likely inherent stability and efficiency. White (1995) argues that the 
technology gives an opportunity to issue private bank notes as smart card balances, 
which are transferable without bank involvement. He adds that digital payment 
technology has begun to foreshadow a world in which central bank currency is 
obsolete - replaced, perhaps, by privately issued currency in the form of balances 
written to smart cards or downloaded to personal computers and transferred by 
means of electronic wallets or over the internet. He also investigates the potential of 
e-money to make small denomination currencies interest-bearing for the first time  
in the history, and concludes that, when combined with anonymity e-money would 
facilitate the public’s turning away from government-based notes and coins. Selgin 
(1996) questioned the general belief that financial innovation makes monetary 
Figure C : Unified Money
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controls more complicated. He proposed that the more financial innovation 
succeeded the less reliance the public would place on central banks as direct sources 
of exchange media. Therefore, he argued, the public could afford to deny the central 
bank its discretionary powers. 
The effects of electronisation are not limited to the retail use of currency but 
extend also to the role of the central bank as the supplier of reserves to banks. 
According to Friedman (1999), three factors bring into question the future of the 
central bank’s role as a monopolist over the supply of bank reserves: the erosion of 
the demand for bank money, the proliferation of non-bank credit, and the 
development of private bank clearing mechanisms. The conclusion, he warned, 
would be that central banks’ ability to conduct monetary policy might deteriorate as 
they could not affect the price level of goods and services in the non-financial 
economy unless they had direct control on interest rate setting. 
Goodhart (2000) did not agree with Friedman, arguing that only incompetence 
(in monetary policy) rather than the IT revolution or e-money may bring about the 
demise of central banks and give a comparative advantage to free banking. He did 
not see the possible anonymity with disposable e-purses as important. Goodhart 
argued that e-money cannot replace central bank base money because only the latter 
can, in his view, enjoy full anonymity, full security and legal tender status. 
However, even if currency demand decreases to zero, the central bank is expected 
to be able set the interest rates though direct quotation to the financial markets. 
Obviously, central banks can provide full coverage for the money that they 
support as long as they have the power to make unlimited losses with the full 
support of the nation. But, the risk of currency substitution may force central banks 
to leave rates to be determined by market forces. As long as the support behind the 
central bank is both safe and sound, the market price may be affected by central 
bank interventions, but once the market questions the cover of money, the risk of 
financial crises may follow, as it happened in Turkey in 1994. In practice, it may be 
that central bank intervention is rendered unnecessary by the realisation of the 
efficiencies to be brought by IT in general and e-money in particular.  
Freedman (2000) reached a similar conclusion while making a case for the 
continuation of central banking. He named two instruments necessary to its 
survival: the potential to refuse the settlement on payment systems other than its 
own, and -when necessary- making or taking deposits on financial markets to force  
 
 




the market rates under its control. But, again, the issue was not that free banking 
would require such things, but that they offered a way for central banks to continue 
their role in monetary policy management. Woodford (2000) defended a similar line 
of argument. Obviously, the power to impose tax gives the power to defend the 
central bank as well, but our concern is whether central banking is the most efficient 
way to maintain the integrity of money and or whether e-money can increase 
alternatives to the right to choose with regards money. 
All these discussions support the relevance of e-money to free banking. In free 
banking terms, the basic requirement for an e-money proposal would be the 
promise of convertibility with any other currency demanded by the holder. Provided 
the regulatory environment were set to allow private competing currencies, this 
requirement would now be met more easily than, say, 50 years ago. While it may 
not be appropriate to expect a revolutionary transformation of current financial 
systems, further deregulation of domestic and international financial institutions 
may lead of itself to an evolutionary transformation towards free banking. 
If we now turn our attention to the relation between e-money and free banking, it 
seems to us that e-money has very significant, even synergetic, effects. Not only 
does e-money foster a clearer understanding of the nature and workings of money, 
and thus of its ‘proper’ management with its influence on banking and finance that 
has been analysed in the earlier section, but its electronic issue may provide a 
technical means to bring free banking into play. Provided the electronic issue of 
money does not become subject to excessive regulation or outlawing
10, it may 
enrich currency choice through a process of substitution that has been supported by 
the e-money based financial service provision. Chief influences of electronisation 
which suggest such a scenario are the following: 
1. Because bits and bytes are more easily re-defined than banknotes and coins, it 
may be easier to revise or change currency representation, leading, in the case of 
countries, to easier entry and exit to monetary unions, and facilitating inter-currency 
switching by end-users and, therefore, private money issue. This view may be 
supported by the long planned currency conversion in the Euro area with 
conventional banknotes and coins. In a future with e-money, any serious financial 
problem that threatens the Euro may allow individual members to express their 
                                                 
10 We recognise that the proviso is substantial, but we are confining our remarks to the economically 
feasible, rather than the politically probable.  
 
 




reaction with the possibility of designing a new monetary framework. On the 
contrary, e-money also ease to join in a short time as well for those potential 
members who has been attracted by well-managed Euro. This mechanism, at the 
end, puts purely economic pressure to the ECB to respect the integrity of Euro so as 
to exclude any kind of political pressure. As a non-national (denationalised) 
currency, it allows non-Euro economies to think of leaving the defence of the 
integrity of money to ECB as well. 
2. Thanks to the opportunities for transparency afforded by Internet applications, 
money can be backed as easily by commodities as by indices, or both. It does not 
mean to turn back to commodity backed currencies but the monetary institutions 
may not take the risk of inflating their currencies because of these opportunities that 
has been available with the advent of e-money technologies. Integrity of money 
may be defended with the cover of money, which is explained in the following 
sections but if the society prefers to see a commodity backing, e-money can only 
help to realise this demand. 
3. The increasing use of distribution channels such as the Internet, digital TV and 
mobile phones, may enable ‘good money’ to reach end-users more easily. 
Conversely, end-users that have need of a reliable medium of exchange may find it 
easier to reach better alternatives. For the same reasons, mismanaged money, what 
Rudi Dornbusch calls ‘funny money’
11, may become limited. E-money in these 
mechanisms extends the reach of currency substitution to micro transactions other 
than medium or large transactions. In a sense, currency substitution includes not 
only store of value but medium of exchange function of money as well. This puts 
extra pressure to the sustainable inflationary currencies around the world. 
4. Ease of access to e-money may speed up the formation of a critical mass, the 
moment when people generally become willing to accept the new proposed unit of 
account because they become convinced that it now enjoys widespread recognition 
and appropriate worldwide liquidity and systemic support. This potential of e-
money allows institutions to challenge mismanaged currencies with stronger 
proposals. The face of alternative proposals may be limited only to imagination. 
Instead of a non-governmental institution like ECB, a gold mine company in 
Australia, for example, may get into the money business to offer an alternative to 
                                                 
11 “When funny money is no joke”, Financial Times, 3.1.2000. Monetary reformists also use this term, 
but they mean time dollars and the like. See, for example, D Boyle, Funny Money, in search of 
alternative currencies.   
 
 




inflationary currencies with the help fast speed enrichment of distribution channels 
to ease access to the offer. This option may be open to any company who can create 
and sustain a customer base for their offer. 
To complete the picture, these many attributes of electronic banking clearly 
reflect key features of Hayek’s (1990) conception of denationalised money – such 
as basketisation, autonomous agreement regarding the unit of account, and 
indexation. 
The defence of central banking per se does not explain currency unions, the 
dollarisation trends spreading in Latin America, or the currency substitutions in 
developing countries unstable monies. To discuss the relation between e-money and 
free banking are not, therefore, to address directly the threats to central banking, but 
to consider the opportunities it presents to create a better monetary regime. This is a 
crucial point. There may well be continued use of interventionist settlement of 
interest rates through forced clearing procedures and depository instruments, but it 
is worth mentioning that foreign exchange interventions have failed many times 
since 1980 and in different parts of the world. 
Insofar as free banking considers that sound money not only delivers price 
stability but also financial stability, it may now be only a matter of time before free 
banking challenges central banking in practical fact with the advent of e-money. 
Such a development would be influenced by the manner in which free banking 
addresses three key questions which e-money serves to emphasise: 
 - the role of lender of last resort  
 - the backing of currencies 
 - the multiplicity of currencies 
5.1. Lender of Last Resort 
Under present monetary policy framework, the misbehaviour of one financial 
institution can have disastrous consequences for the financial system as a whole 
with regards the risk for a total collapse of the money stock. In order to prevent 
contagious risk, central banks are given the sole right to issue money without limit 
and for as long as it takes, provided the situation is in extremis and the danger is 
systemic. The lender of last resort is a costly arrangement and there is always a risk 
for socialisation of private losses.  
 
 




On the other hand, free banking leaves it to the market to ‘discipline’ bad money 
and it does not entertain the need for a lender of last resort. It is believed that the 
system will never fall into a systemic risk because the invisible hand of market 
mechanism forces every individual financial institution to be ready against bank-
runs. It is also believed that weakened and unfeasible institutions will be replaced 
by the competitors before they create any systemic risk. If the danger still persist, 
Dowd and others envisage ‘option clauses’, whereby in extreme circumstances 
banks can exercise compensatory delays to withdrawals. This is a concept of 
prudence – appealing to the depositor to avoid rash investment and precipitate 
action.  
E-money serves to reinforce free banking by providing it with a powerful 
instrument for its realisation and it may decrease the need for a lender of last resort 
for at least two reasons. The first one is because option clauses becomes very easy 
to arrange, manage and realise, thanks not only to the electronification of money but 
also electronic finance, electronic distribution channels and electronic relationship 
management. E-money serves to decrease the costs of making and performing on 
option clauses and all manners of contracts between issuers and users. 
Secondly, it creates new frameworks to analyse individual defenders of the 
integrity of money so as to take individual decisions, which in the end, eliminates 
systemic structuring within the financial service provision. It allows individual 
institutions to develop personalised relations with the end users so as to be ready to 
convince them on the quality of their service in case of a fall of a financial 
institution. Lender of last resort function is not to save individual institutions and 
unless one failure does not effect other members of the financial system, there will 
be no need for it in the first place. With increased end-user awareness supported by 
e-money, no economic entity will question the overall stability of the system when 
they can easily reach to the data that can convince them about the integrity of 
money that they rely on. 
It may be worth to mention at this stage the possibility and consequences of a 
seamless emergence of free banking since even present events seem to be taking 
their cue from free banking precepts. In the case of Long Term Capital 
Management in the autumn of 1998, for example, the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank orchestrated, but did not participate in, a bail out by other Wall Street banks, 
who, presumably, mustered enough reserves to meet the situation. Losses were not  
 
 




socialised. Similar can be said of Barings in 1996. In the case of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand, even though it has regulatory responsibilities, its requirement on 
banks to account direct to the public appeals to, or at least induces, their common 
interest as financial service providers to co-operate against systemic risk. E-money 
confirms this direction and even enhances realisation of it. The pre-emptive 
techniques of free banking can readily be introduced as pre-stated conditions 
requiring e-money users to click on “acceptance” before proceeding. These 
developments already give signs of free banking practices even under current 
monetary policy framework and e-money can only extend the reach of these 
practices. 
5.2. Currency Backing 
If one is clear that a lender of last resort is not envisaged by free banking because 
it is not necessary, one can turn one’s attention to two related topics – the cover of 
money (backing of currency) and a multiplicity of currencies (currency 
competition). The unit of account function of money generally has two aspects. On 
the one hand, for money to enjoy general acceptance, the unit of account needs to 
be widely recognised, otherwise circulation will be impeded and people will not 
wish to use it. Thus, for example, the US dollar enjoys far greater global acceptance 
than the Russian rouble. In crisis moments, however, the unit of account in itself is 
not enough. Money’s ability to act as a medium of exchange becomes a matter of its 
backing or its cover. Until 1973, gold provided the anchor for all currencies, even 
though technically it was held at a remove. Since then, foreign currency reserves 
(that is to say, other units of account) have played an increasing role. To give an 
example, the backing for US dollar is the power of US economy to keep the value 
of dollar against other currencies strong enough to eliminate any loss of the value 
for end-users. Liquid money and capital markets and strong fiscal structure with 
budget surpluses further sustain the cover of the US dollar. 
It is important to consider the question of cover in the context of our overall 
approach (Figure E). It may be no accident that much of 20th century monetary 
history centres on a debate about cover and the quest for a replacement to the gold 
standard of equivalent effect but without the disadvantages of gold. It was during 
the beginning of the 20
th century that central banks (in the negative sense) came to 
the fore, printing bad money seemingly without constraint. The ultimate cover of 
such money is, of course, future tax revenue, which is an indirect reference to future  
 
 




profitability. Tax cover and fiat finance may disguise but cannot change the basic 
economic fact that the cover of money entails a spectrum between potential values 
and created values, future profitability and existing assets, or a mixture of the two. 
Where we are on the spectrum depends largely on economic conditions. 
 CONSUMABLES  (TAXATION)  FUTURE  PROFITS 
Fig. E : Spectrum of Cover 
This image is neither new nor radical. In terms of our analytical framework, the 
spectrum of cover suggests that ‘cash’, or money as a medium of exchange, is 
related to the finite things that one can buy. Insofar as money is not backed by 
consumable goods, it cannot but be a potential (and in crisis moments, actual) call 
on future profits. This is the true match for money as store of value. 
This image is important because it is ordering, on the one hand, yet admits to a 
wide variety of backings, on the other. One cannot say, for example, that gold is 
good and assignats are bad. Indeed, free banking experience embraces both. The 
point is that the backing has to be appropriate and adequate.  
In the world of so-called alternative currencies, often the same software package 
is used, but the currencies are denominated by reference to local artefacts or 
symbols. For example, tales in Canterbury (after the famous book by Chaucer), but 
yawls in nearby Whitstable (a type of fishing boat used there). Similarly, these 
currencies have a variety of economic underpinnings. Some are related at 1:1 or 
other parities to the national currency and to each other. Others define themselves in 
terms of a set wage. The yawl, for example, being equal to £5 per hour, regardless 
of what one does – jobbing gardening or legal services. Likewise, in New York 
State an Ithaca Hour is equivalent to one hour of work valued at $10. The same 
trend holds for virtual (i.e. Internet-based) experiments as well. Digicash, for 
example, was intended to create a pure Internet-based representation of national 
currencies, whereas e-gold
12 represents a digitalised allocation of gold, enabling it 
to be used as a medium of exchange for virtual life with the potential to reach 
conventional life in the same way as achieved through the co-operation between 
Mondex and Beenz, namely, smart cards. 
                                                 
12 www.e-gold.com   
 
 




Provided e-monies remain uncontrolled and unregulated other than the free 
workings of markets, therefore, their emergence implies a furtherance of free 
banking precepts. This possibility is especially real because e-monies support 
independent clearing systems with decreased demand for central bank money and 
allow non-bank credit expansion through an easing of distribution channels. A 
further feature - anonymity - reinforces this trend and may prove possible with the 
development of ‘blind signature’ technology or, more simply, by the use of 
disposable tokens issued on the networks of PCs, digital TVs, personal digital 
assistants like palms and mobile telephony. E-money, as a result, puts extra 
pressure to keep the cover of money strong enough to keep the integrity of money 
to sustain the trust. As a result independent issuers of e-money may decide to back 
(or cover) the issued amount with alternative choices. For example, the issued 
amount of money may be fully backed with money market funds. Another backing 
may be stock exchange indexes or any kind of real estate funds. Actually there is no 
limit on the alternatives for backing because anything that can sustain end-user’s 
trust on the integrity of money may be used as backing. There seems nothing wrong 
with the current backings of major world currencies as well. As long as US dollar 
and Euro are competitive and end-users in the US and Europe are allowed to choose 
between these two currencies, they may compete with their backings as well. In this 
case, the backing of the currencies is just the future potentials on either side of the 
Atlantic to sustain the strengths of these economies. As far as financial stability is 
sustained on both areas with competent central banks, the end-users will have no 
reason to ask for an alternative backing but once there is a demand for another 
backing, then e-money can only help to design a new arrangement and help to 
sustain the compatibility against weakened currencies. 
5.3. Multiplicity of Currencies 
The prospect of unregulated currencies implies multiple currencies or currency 
competition, giving rise to the question of how these would work. The case of 
LTCM, for example, illustrates the ability of financial institutions to create credit 
“outside the box”
13, a characteristic made more problematical where the money 
involved is e-money and one that may warrant a review of the relation between the 
monetary base and credit creation. It follows that the nature of the respective covers 
                                                 
13 Quoting from an unpublished interview with Frederik Musch, a long-standing member of the Basle 
Committee and Associate Director of the Financial Stability Institute in Basle.  
 
 




may be defined differently, and yet 100% cover is maintained in both cases (Figure 
E). 
The fungibility of cover is supported by the clearinghouse system, which does 
not arbitrate over what the ‘right’ cover should be, but leaves this to the market. 
After free banking theory, multiple currencies do not proliferate, but are subject to 
rationalisation. In their ultimate expression of self-administered banking (home 
banking, etc.), one can envisage one currency per person
14. This is wholly 
impracticable, however, since trade and division of labour even between two people 
requires a common element, a universal language enabling communication. It is 
said that multiple currencies imply a worldwide bank, but surely this, too, requires a 
common language. However many names we give to our separate currencies, they 
need to be linked. To be sure, these linkages do not need to be determined, as under 
the gold standard, from gold (or some other backing) via a primary currency or 
numeraire, thence to all others. Rather, the independently determined currencies 
will coalesce in an implied reciprocator (‘best basket’), a shared unit of account one 
level up, so to speak. Parities may not all be 1:1, but parities will be needed and 
they will need to be based on floating, so that market forces can be allowed to work 
to discover the best denominator. Put another way, the actual parties to any 
transaction are free to determine the parity that suits them. 
Insofar as this scenario takes us beyond national economic considerations and 
the world economy at large becomes our primary frame of reference, here we touch 
again upon free banking’s recognition of the need, at least as advocated by Hayek, 
to denationalise money. This, as is readily conceded, leads to a shrinking number of 
currencies – the logic of which may be the universalisation of finance. Global 
financial markets and electronic finance in particular do not respect national 
monetary jurisdictions, so that their impact must be to promote homogeneity in the 
fields of monetary policy and supervision, and the denationalisation of money. 
Indeed, for this purpose, there could hardly be a more effective means than e-
money. 
The denationalisation of currencies gives rise to a further consideration, 
however. To denominate money in a national motif is to mask the fact that what 
really matters is (a) its interchangeability with other currencies and (b) their mutual 
                                                 
14 This idea was recently described by Mark Salmon as one of two theoretical but impractical extremes 
on a spectrum, the other being a single world economy. (See “How Many Currencies does the World 
need?”, City Business, Spring 1999).  
 
 




convertibility into real rather than fiat or, perhaps better put, sound rather than 
unsound, cover. In this respect, e-money easily extends the reach of good money 
with the best cover to the end holder, functioning successfully both as a medium of 
exchange and as a store of value. Every holder of money also gets to choose from 
among currencies that are independent of local availability constraints. The 
multiplicity of currencies in this regard makes more than one unit of account 
available as the common denominator in trade at both local and international levels 
with the right to choose the currency that is most preferred. This practice is limited 
at the moment on the level of currency substitution but e-money extends the reach 
of good money and increases the level of competition among national and 
international, which helps to save individually strong money with sustainable 
integrity. 
As a result, privately issued independent e-money may not find a place to 
challenge the influence of the US dollar and Eurozone but this may not lower the 
impact of e-money to ease free banking practices. A competition between Euro and 
the US dollar itself may extend the reach of free banking to possibly a better 
financial order and legally supporting this potential by allowing legal tender status 
on both sides for both currencies may further enrich free banking practices. 
6. Contestable Central Banking 
As we have said at various times in this paper, the fact, as it seems to us, that e-
money not only supports free banking, but provides a medium for its 
implementation, gives rise to a question concerning the interface of this 
development with modern central banking. It seems to us that there is a need to 
envisage a transitional arrangement that enables central banking to move towards 
free banking. This is what we have in mind with our concept of contestable central 
banking. 
6.1. Definition 
Because of the controversies associated with central banking, this term requires 
some introduction. It does not refer to the central bank as the agent to or banker of 
government in the traditional sense. Even though central banks have acquired many 
functions that they fulfil on behalf of governments, our focus is on their role in what 
one might call systemic management of the economy. While for many people this 
may be a proper and appropriate role for government, we do not regard monetary 
matters as needing to be carried out by governments. Indeed, history shows that  
 
 




when governments control central banks they often cause considerable financial and 
monetary mischief. Contestable central banking looks beyond central banks as 
instruments of short-termist and/or inflationary policies, let alone as a means 
whereby governments can give effect to profligacy, to envisage their emancipation 
from governmental control. The concept thus takes account of such actual 
developments as the transfer of debt management out of central banks and the 
private delivery of public account operations. It also envisages a change of 
emphasis in the role of central banks towards financial data collection, as in the 
example of the recent Bank of England Act, which gave the Bank the right to 
collect from any source all kinds of data pertaining to a full analysis of the 
functioning of the economy. Finally, contestable central banking entails taking the 
international or global context as a primary frame of reference, and is thus 
compatible with free banking concepts of denationalised money. 
We do not claim that contestable central banking equates with free banking, but 
that it may describe a transition route towards it – a natural evolution away from 
interventionism to contextual influence. This approach is also shared by White 
(1995), who argued that “the rationale of free banking is simply that of a 
spontaneously evolved or ‘natural’ monetary order.” As we have seen, under free 
banking, at the centre of the economy is a clearinghouse for financial institutions 
based both on competitive issue and competitive backing. In this system, financial 
data are generally available and the onus is on the user to assure himself that he is 
not accepting ‘bad’ money. E-money can only enhance the transparency and 
general availability of data that free banking contemplates. Similarly, as its name 
implies, contestable central banking distinguishes between central banking and 
central auditing, referring to arrangements in which central bank functions have 
been reduced and focussed on to the collection and analysis of financial data, rather 
than direct management of money flows. Money-become-information becomes the 
medium for making sound judgements for otherwise market-based activities, 
enabling the markets to do the work of the central bank, especially in regards to 
monetary policy and financial supervision. In this sense, a contestable central bank 
acts as a societal agent in its own right, focusing on contextual decisions, but 
otherwise leaving the direct provision and management of both ‘cash’ and ‘credit’ 
to the markets, a concept that very much reflects free banking’s clearinghouse.  
To give a concrete indication of what we have in mind, consider the latest 
developments in the case of the Bank of England. As well as having made price  
 
 




stability the focus of its monetary policy, pursued in the framework of central bank 
independence, the Bank has devolved supervision. It has also set up a Monetary 
Policy Committee as a body of financial and economic experts with a clearly 
economic remit – to deliver price stability. Whether or not the Bank can be seen as 
a model, the fact seems certain that it illustrates a clear trend in central banking to 
allow central bankers to take decisions in accordance with market initiatives, rather 
than government interests. As a result, central banks have started to publish 
informative reports explaining current and expected monetary conditions. This 
trend towards market orientation may be a step towards full dependence on the 
‘invisible hand’ working of market forces. From the denationalisation of money 
point of view, ECB may provide a similar example in this argument as Euro is an 
international currency in character. More than that, actual dollarisation is already 
effective in some Latin American countries. These examples may show that 
traditional monetary framework is already under a transitory process. 
It is in this sense that contestable central banking can be seen to mark a possible 
transition from a central banking based monetary policy framework towards free 
banking. One could characterise contestable central banking in the following way, 
therefore: 
- Societal but market-oriented institutions 
-  Expertise based, rather than government appointed monetary policy 
committees focussed on market solutions instead of interventionist policy 
instruments. 
- Exclusion of debt management. 
- Exclusion of liquidity management relating to public accounts. 
- Exclusion of financial supervision. 
- Exclusion of Issue Department through privatisation of bank note issuance and 
the Mint. 
- Maximum transparency on decision making process. 
- Maximum efficiency in data analysis and risk management. 
This operational definition of contestable central banking presupposes the image 
of the bank as a societal agent in its own right, mandated by and reporting directly 
to parliament (or its equivalent). The main purpose of the mandate is to spell out in  
 
 




constitutional and legislative terms what the central bank is responsible for and to 
ensure its autonomy both from the government of the day and financial interests. 
The legislative context also sets out how the bank’s mandate is to be reviewed and 
revised and how conflicts are to be resolved. The bank operates in a context of 
democratic accountability. Not, however, by way of electoral procedures, but by 
acting in a clear and transparent manner, and by reporting in a clear, regular, and 
meaningful way to parliament or its equivalent, not necessarily to a national but 
possibly international as well. It operates in a contestable capacity as regards the 
workings of economic life generally with the same data being thereby also available 
internationally. Its ability to work in this way is strengthened by complete freedom 
in terms of when, how, and what it communicates, provided its transparency and 
reporting requirements are enhanced thereby. With its democraticness thus 
safeguarded, and in keeping with a clear demarcation between political and 
economic considerations, the central bank is essentially charged with supporting the 
well being and even operation of the economy as a whole, for which we use the 
term ‘systemicity’. The essential concept here is the promotion of a stable level of 
economic activity through the maintenance of price stability. Enhanced consumer 
awareness for financial services by e-money can only help such a framework to be 
efficient and effective. 
Described thus, contestable central banking is clearly not synonymous with free 
banking, but it may be setting the stage for a more fundamental change of regime. It 
could, for example, result in central banks behaving as central agencies to help 
financial institutions find opportunities to reduce operating costs (e.g. payment 
system standardisation). They could distribute financial data for all economic 
entities, thus facilitating its analysis by anyone, while also publishing its own 
financial reports parallel to independent sources. This would serve to inhibit the 
over-issue of any type of e-money (whether backed, indexed, or simple fiat), thus 
helping guarantee monetary and financial stability by preventing the systemic risk 
caused by regulatory illusion. With all the above in place, it would then be a 
relatively simple step for central banks to allow private money issue, eliminating 
legal tender in favour of competitive issue – not perhaps within single economic 
areas like the Eurozone, but between the Euro and the US dollar, for example.  
Thus contestable central banking can be seen as a means for promoting the 
integrity of money under free markets as far as possible and of limiting 
interventionism in regard to interest rates, foreign exchange rates and similar  
 
 




financial indicators. It is directly accountable to society in the first place but has 
well defined responsibilities to report to and be audited by parliament. It reports to 
the public through periodical reports, even daily when this is needed to maintain 
confidence in the integrity of money and stability of financial markets. Contestable 
central banking rejects any kind of political interference in policy instruments and 
disdains the creation of moral hazard. Market settlement and market transmission 
mechanisms are given top priority and stability is defended through expertise with 
increased risk management and data analysis techniques. The main function of 
contestable central banking is to fulfil the ‘centralised’ characteristics of the 
financial system, which is a common feature of both central and free banking, with 
centralised here meant in an operational, rather than power sense. It also offers a 
transition path out of ‘incompetent’ central banking. Central banks competes with 
each other to sustain the integrity of their monies within free market rules and they 
do not prefer to create barriers to entry to their currency zones with any means 
including legal tender arrangements. End users are allowed to have the right to 
choose the money that they want to have and they have the right to contract on the 
money they prefer. Whether this leads to ‘competent’ central banking or free 
banking will remain to be seen. In either scenario, e-money is a parallel 
phenomenon that enriches the solutions to the problems of current monetary policy 
regimes. 
6.2. Transforming Seigniorage 
Enough has been said to show that free banking may yet be seen to have a 
different significance than either its opponents or protagonists have in mind, and 
that the principles that it advocates may well be at work in a de facto, unintended 
way. To bring this paper to a close, however, we would like to make one final 
comment concerning contestable central banking and seigniorage. 
As rehearsed already, the concept of contestable central banking distinguishes 
between three main aspects or tasks - the conduct of monetary policy, supervision 
of the financial markets, and maintaining the integrity of the unit of account – and 
then envisages their articulation or devolution. Such an image of the development 
of central banking has a profound implication in that the seigniorage relation 
disappears and, with it, the possibility that seigniorage can be abused or high-jacked 
by the government of the day for non-economic purposes. We do not mention this 
for political reasons, but because it seems to be implied by the historical  
 
 




developments we are seeking to illustrate. Indeed, we considered making no 
mention of seigniorage at all, but it seems that some transformation of seigniorage 
is built into the logic of things. Omitting any mention of it might have suggested 
that this aspect of the financial system would be unaffected, an unlikely event that it 
would have been disingenuous to ignore.  
Current developments may result in a redefinition of seigniorage, away from the 
“irrational” and inflationary habit of “printing money” to pay debt, a concept of 
seigniorage that should be confined to immature approaches to central banking. We 
would like to think that money is sufficiently understood nowadays, at least in the 
developed economies, so as to be beyond the mis-management entailed by such 
practices. The recent financial turmoil in Russia, for example, had much to do with 
their not having appreciated that the inflationary effects of manipulating the 
domestic monetary base would invite currency substitution and thus undermine the 
financial system. In the Russian case, it is likely that any seigniorage gains expected 
were more than cancelled out by the punishing short-run interest rates that the mis-
management incurred, as has been the case in other such situations . This hardly 
makes a case for seigniorage. On the contrary, seeking income from the printing of 
money is likely only to cause distortions in the money stock, leading to monetary 
and financial crises. Consequently, it may be better to limit the definition of 
seigniorage to the amount of profit from money business made by public authorities 
through their production, distribution and management of money.  
In recent years, for example, especially in developed economies, a significant 
portion of profit has come from the interest earnings from the bond and bill 
holdings of monetary authorities used to back the amount of currency in circulation. 
For example, the US Treasury earns around 5% seigniorage on the issuance of 
dollars. The Bank of England also profits from bank note issue through its Issuing 
Department (see Chart 2), so that even in current circumstances central banks can 
make a profit without dealing with banknotes and coins, since the Issue Department 


















As the chart shows, the Banking Department is independently profitable, with 
some of its profit even being transferred to HM Treasury. At the same time, the cost 
of central banking has been diminishing along with that of conventional banking, 
thanks in part to the effects of cheaper computing and communicating costs.  
7. Conclusions 
To sum up, the impacts and effects of e-money are broad-ranging and far-
reaching. We focus on three areas in particular: 
1. For two main reasons, e-money may lead to a new era for free banking type 
practices. Firstly, innovation in payment technology is reducing the fixed costs of 
banking business. Being cheaper than printing, distributing and retrieving 
banknotes through banking systems, the creation of digital strings of money is 
likely to reduce the cost of maintaining a payment system infrastructure for the 
economy as a whole. This may attract more economic entities to provide financial 
services as the natural barriers to entry to the banking sector become less effective. 
Secondly, as the computing power of new generations of computers increases, risk 
management and data processing with huge amounts of entries might become risk-
free and less costly to process. It may then be possible that the information 
monopoly of banks relating to financial services may deteriorate, giving further 
opportunities for non-banks to supply financial services to customers. Such a 
development may decrease the special treatment of banks over against other firms, 
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so that the argument about the private positions of banks in an economy may 
become even harder to defend.  
2. The development of e-money further implies radical changes in regard to 
money, banking, and finance due to the manner in which it ‘befriends’ markets 
solutions to monetary problems. Its impact in terms of the lender of last resort 
function, currency backing, and multiple currencies is likely to be especially 
powerful. 
3. Technically, e-money may have different impacts for different functions of 
money. With regard to the unit of account function, it may be expected that e-
money would decrease network externalities by both decreasing the fixed cost of 
networking (for example private clearing systems are already available) and by 
lowering the cost of switching from one local network to the other (choosing 
alternative units of account without difficulty provided legal tender laws are 
adjusted to allow freedom to contract in preferred currencies). 
With regard to the medium of exchange function, e-money would facilitate 
currency competition by allowing economic entities to provide technically efficient 
and effective alternative monies to reach end-users. Competitive issue is not 
necessarily national in character; it may be international as well, witness the 
competition between the euro and the US Dollar. Even at its current stage of 
development, e-money in banking the provision of ‘multiple currency based 
individual accounts’ that are transferable to any currency at any moment of time, 
while one bankcard may allow one to spend in different denominations anywhere in 
the world. E-money thus offers local and international solutions to settlement 
problems, thereby enriching the cover of money. Through local exchange trading 
systems, anything from bread to time may be defined as money as long as there is a 
community willing to accept it and such ‘local’ solutions may be extended to wider 
regions provided the supply of the instrument manages to create enough demand. E-
money enables anything - from gold to seashells – to be distributed electronically 
within local or international networks. Such a development increases people’s 
understanding of money and financial markets and puts pressure on financial 
institutions to be more transparent to the society they serve. It brings good money in 
reach of anybody on earth as far as they have a network connection, and increases 
the awareness of the growing importance of stable currencies at the international as 
well as the national level.  
 
 




With regard to the store of value function, e-money would increase the quality 
and quantity of information available. This would greatly help to reduce imperfect 
information possibilities, to increase data processing and risk management 
techniques, and to make easier portfolio selection procedures. Secondly, it would 
decrease barriers to entry to financial service provision, a fact already observable in 
the financial industry. With regard to systemic problems for the financial industry, 
it is likely that e-money will support individual assessment of the safety and 
soundness of particular financial institutions. This would allow individual treatment 
of troubled financial institutions, decreasing contagious trends. By reducing the 
interdependence of financial service providers in this way, the risk of systemic 
problems may also be reduced as a consequence of e-money. Lastly, in the sense 
that e-money also implies or refers to the wider phenomenon of electronic finance 
generally, it is having a profound impact in the banking system. Taken as a whole, 
online banking, tele-banking, mobile-phone banking, computer-based accounting 
systems, and so on, are making entry into banking ever easier by making explicit 
and replicable processes that previously were not generally understood and were the 
province of experts.  
Although explanations of them may not say so in so many words, current 
developments in the financial world seem to be unfolding along the lines indicated 
in this paper. They approximate certain features of free banking, although not as a 
result of free banking advocacy, and they are reinforced, even accelerated by the 
emergence of electronic finance and e-money. Their appearance suggests that, 
unless ‘repackaged’ in a contestable way, the future of central banking may become 
uncertain. Central banks may yet, therefore, become transformed in conformity with 
free banking philosophy and principles. 
From this point of view, the advent of so-called e-money is both a technological 
and monetary phenomenon, and care should be taken not to underestimate its 
significance. If the ‘incompetence’ argument is accepted, as would seem 
reasonable, the fact that e-money is of relevance in both central banking and free 
banking contexts indicates that it will increase the efficiency and productivity of the 
future of current monetary and financial systems, whether conducted within existing 
or revised arrangements.  
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